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After the collapse of the Iron Curtain, all nations tried to assess an environment in 
which the probability of a mass conventional attack from one of the super powers is very 
low. This trend is supported by the operations conducted by NATO or the UN to present 
day. Governments had seen this period as an opportunity to decrease massive defense 
budgets and find better ways to spend taxpayer’s money. However, historic conflicts, the 
threat of nuclear, biologic and chemical warheads used with long-range ballistic missiles 
and differences between policies/national characteristics are still present. These facts 
have prompted nations to approach carefully the idea of a smaller, lower-cost national 
defense force. The only choice other than maintaining a large force was investing in 
technology and newer, more precise weapons. As time went on, and “unusual” operations 
that were not within the experience or mission statement of organizations such as NATO 
were conducted, for example in the Balkans, those organizations, as well as individual 
nations, felt the need to revise their force structures and acquisition strategies. Collateral 
damage avoidance and stand-off capabilities became essential, even though it was 
expensive to develop and acquire such capabilities. On the other hand, economically 
powerful nations no longer had the excuse of conducting a weapons race against another 
power to justify large expenditures on weapons. Although the need for advanced, 
expensive weapons systems grew, defense budgets, and with them, existing defense 
industrial bases shrank, resulting in a loss of competition. Thus, advanced weapons 
development and acquisition was even more expensive because from then on, some of the 
effort had to be spent to maintain the industrial base. Therefore, it was time to make a 
decision. They would either try to develop and produce their own weapon systems as 
they had done previously and bear the burden of all expenses entailed as well as prove the 
effectiveness of a system to create a market or they would cooperate in various phases of 
the project, such as development and production and share the expenses, expertise and 
technology in order to create a market even before the first prototype is out in the field. 
 2
Of course, the latter idea was not without problems. Security, economic and political 
issues as well as the work share ratios were some of the issues that surfaced instantly. 
In addition to these facts, as Raymond E. Franck, Jr. stated in his article “Recent 
Developments in the Global Defense Marketplace” (Graduate School of Business and 
Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School-August 2001), a change in the defense 
environment is closely related to defense acquisition reform, a revolution in military 
affairs, the onset of information age economies, and the globalization of economic 
activities. Of course, it is arguable whether these movements resulted in the recent 
changes or they are the results of the changes. When movements after the 11th September 
2001 terrorist attacks to the World Trade Center buildings, Pentagon and third hijacked 
plane are taken into consideration, it is possible to come to the conclusion that recent 
changes cause such revolutions in the defense environment and to see how governments 
and/or industry are foreseeing the future of the situation. The efficiency provided when 
nations work together seems to become a priority and it would be expected that countries 
would be willing to sacrifice some of their national goals for it. Basically, there are two 
opinions. You are either for or against this expectation. The first is if the nation would be 
dependent on another country’s production for critical items or subcomponents for a 
weapon system manufactured through a co-development arrangement, and how would 
national security be affected if a conflict were to occur between the two nations. This idea 
is also addressed in R. E. Franck’s article as the concerns about the growing international 
trade: 
…expanding international trade has increased economic specialization 
among nations. This has proven an especially sensitive issue when 
interdependence means loss of self-sufficiency in military production. 
The second opinion basically depends on the idea that conflicts are less likely to 
occur if a nation is engaged in business relations with another nation. The greatest 
obstacle to this idea are the “Buy National” acts that exist in almost all legislation in 
countries worldwide. Both ideas may be supported by some of the arrangements made in 
co-development projects. 
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Nations use several ways to protect and improve their national industries, such as 
non-tariff barriers, off-set arrangements, co-production proposals, strategic partnering 
arrangements and finally co-development efforts. This thesis will address the issues and 
concerns raised within the completed and on going co-development projects such as FLA 
(Future Large Aircraft), Eurofighter, MEADS (Medium Extended Air Defense System), 
and JSF (Joint Strike Fighter). These are all Acquisition Category I (ACAT I), major 
weapon systems projects. In addition, I will also address the solutions implemented to 
overcome the problems and generalize the potential issues that may be raised in typical 
co-development projects regarding the status of the participating nations as being 
developed, developing or underdeveloped countries, and their economic as well as 
political stance. The question of whether this is the correct approach, if it can be 
implemented as a solution to the modernization effort of a nation’s defense forces and 
simply if the idea is feasible for the future will also be addressed. In general, this thesis 
will glean lessons learned from the projects selected as examples. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The news and documents written about the projects used as examples were 
researched and chosen from the Internet and library resources. Problems raised during the 
execution of the project were highlighted and an attempt was made to gather information 
on the solutions implemented to solve those problems. Then, the problems were 
generalized by disregarding the specific needs of the specific projects. This was easy 
since many of the participant nations, and the general situation, was similar in those 
projects. Nevertheless, the assumption is that the problems raised are more or less 
applicable to a variety of situations and a combination of participants. It is also assumed 
that the solutions implemented in those projects are potential solutions that can be used to 
overcome a tense situation at least as far as the expertise they represent. Lastly, this thesis 
emphasizes the future of international co-development efforts so that they will be 
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II. REVIEW OF THE SELECTED PROJECTS  
A. FUTURE LARGE AIRCRAFT (FLA-A400M) 
Recent operations have shown mobility to be one of the most important 
capabilities of a force. The Gulf War and the operations in Kosovo and Afganistan 
demonstrated that the Armed Forces are extremely dependent on air transport. However, 
many countries also realized the urgent need to modernize their aging transport fleets 
which in European countries consists mostly of the C-130 Hercules and C-160 Transall 
aircraft. Since 1982, different groups, including Aerospatiale, British Aerospace, and 
Lockheed , possessing transport aircraft manufacturing experience, were working on the 
FIMA-Future International Military Airlifter. In December 1987, Aeritalia and CASA-
Construcciones Aeronautics S.A.,Spain Based aircraft manufacturer- joined the group. 
The United States (U.S.) launched the C-17 program to refurbish its long range, high 
capacity air transport fleet that is in a different category. The capacity of C-17 then 
became the standard criteria in addressing air transport capability within NATO. The 
U.S. also depended on the C-130J to renovate its aging C-130 fleet as well as modify the 
present aircraft. For two reasons, to react to this need, European countries decided to 
follow a different way other than the traditional approach, which is basically acquiring 
the available system, by doing co-production and licensing arrangements to satisfy 
national economic and technological goals and to sustain European industrial capabilities 
in that area.  The C-17 resulted in being an expensive solution. It costs approximately 
$250 million per aircraft. Within a consortium, several European countries started to 
develop their own transport aircraft and chose the Airbus consortium as the prime 
contractor. In the Western European Union (WEU) Assembly Document 1484, 6 
November 1995, Military Airlift Prospects for the Europe Report (www.fas.org/man/dod-
101/sys/ac/row/1484e.htm), this approach is stated as follows: 
(ii) Stressing the need for European countries to have adequate means, 
particularly airborne for armed forces projection in the context of military 
or humanitarian operations; 
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(iii) Considering Europe’s need to manage its military airlift resources in 
common and to co-ordinate its operational requirements by exploiting its 
economic and industrial capabilities to the full; 
(vi) Stressing nevertheless the need to strengthen and develop this 
potential (European potential in existing aircraft industry) in order to 
ensure a high level of equipment for European armed forces and to 
maintain European industrial capabilities in the face of competition from 
the United States and Russian military airlift; 
(vii) Considering that much is at stake with the FLA programme, not 
merely for the future of European defense capabilities but for the very 
survival of the European aeronautics industry; 
(X) Noting nevertheless that any delay in this programme makes it 
necessary to find short and medium term solutions for replacing large 
capacity military airlift fleets achieved at present through the procurement 
of American or Russian aircraft with economic consequences European 
industry and political consequences for developing an independent 
European defence. 
On the Airbus website (www.airbus-military.com/requirement_main.html) 
Europe’s need for a large transport aircraft is stated as follows: 
Since 1998 there have been over 60 requests for assistance to deal with 
international crisis situations, with over 40% requiring the use of fixed 
wing transport aircraft. More recently, events in Kosovo, East Timor and 
Mozambique have highlighted the need for a reliable, long reach airlift 
capability, with maximum interoperability between air forces. 
In the same document, the need statement is published under the European Staff 
Requirement (ESR) section as follows: 
The Air Forces of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
Turkey and United Kingdom have precisely defined their existing and 
future military air transport requirements by jointly endorsing the Future 
Large Aircraft ESR. This represents a remarkable example of pan-
European collaboration and an opportunity to standardize transport fleets 
across Europe. 
In this statement, several expected goals of international co-development efforts 
are revealed. The first is defining requirements jointly, which facilitates an international 
development effort. This issue was not unknown to the countries that are members of the 
same organizations such as NATO, the Warsaw Pact or the European Union. These 
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organizations have policies directing the members to a standardization effort. However, 
the initial approaches were mostly efforts to integrate existing systems to the framework 
of the organization within the interoperability concept. Since the defense sector is a 
technology intense, high money generating industry, the economic goals of individual 
countries were more powerful than overall cooperation. Besides, technological 
achievements should have been guarded as national secrets even between the nations 
belonging to the same organization. However, the current situation is now forcing nations 
to collaborate because the development of new systems is very expensive and decreases 
in the budget force the militaries to focus on maintenance costs, which are also 
tremendous. As the Secretary of the U.S. Navy, Mr. England, stated in his speech at NPS 
(Naval Postgraduate School), “The tail is bigger than the teeth, and still getting bigger.”   
Regarding this specific project, Europe was also seeking an indigenous capability 
independent of the defense industry of the United States. The second goal is generating a 
source that is expected to be politically more reliable. Starting with the end of WWII, 
European countries were dependent on the vast resources of the United States to counter 
the Iron Curtain war machine. However, efforts have always existed to build up national 
defense industries. The efforts can also be explained by basic economic considerations. 
The defense industry generates jobs for citizens as well as a large amount of cash from 
foreign sales. 
Standardization of the transport fleets across Europe points at the third goal, 
which is one way to achieve interoperability. Owning the same aircraft would not only 
supply interoperability within these NATO countries, but also economies of scale. The 
arrangement made was such that each participant country would build a part of the 
aircraft that also would ensure the development and survival of the independent European 
defense industry. This was stressed many times in the WEU assembly document. This 
fact and concern, in other words, was stated as follows in the introduction section of the 
same document as well as the possible affordable approaches to the problem: 
2. Antonov, C-17, FLA-ATF, Galaxy, Hercules and Transall have become 
familiar names and acronyms for the general public. But apart from their 
publicity value, they represent substantial political, military, economic and 
technological investments with far reaching implications... Falling defense 
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budgets, proliferation of low-intensity conflicts and the increased role of 
humanitarian operations require sound choices to be made as resources are 
limited in a constantly changing world… 
4. This also explains why there is increasing recourse to international co-
operation and the strengthening of other options such as the use of 
commercial aircraft for military airlift purposes. The combination of these 
two factors enables cost to be lowered while ensuring high levels of 
technological performance and a wider range of aircraft available…what 
backing is available for very long-haul flights, and what supporting 
infrastructure is available on arrival. 
In this statement, the trend to use as many commercial items and services as 
possible in defense systems for efficiency and affordability is expressed as well as the 
systems support requirements regarding life cycle costs and the maintainability of the 
related system. Since almost in every European country a national airline is owned in 
various percentages by the government, using the option of commercial aircraft may be 
attractive but a commercial aircraft will not necessarily be able to fulfill the military 
requirements. We may infer that the availability of compatible support infrastructure in 
more than one country is as important as having a system that can operate effectively 
with no or limited host nation support. 
After addressing the needs statements and general acquisition policy, steps will 
now be discussed to achieve the goal. 
In 1995, the management of the FLA program was transferred to a European 
consortium through the creation of the Airbus Military Company (AMC). The expected 
cost of the aircraft is around $80 million. In the same year, the Western European Union 
(WEU) Assembly Document 1484, of 06 November 1995, concerning the Military Airlift 
prospects for the Europe Report, was written. It stated that participating countries were to 
acquire 300 aircraft. Furthermore, in the same document, it was stated that other 
European countries were to be perceived as potential customers. The maiden flight was 
scheduled for 2002 and first deliveries for 2004. The aircraft would be designed to be a 
multi purpose aircraft that could also be used in missions such as electronic warfare and 
offensive air support. Different versions of the aircraft would be created for use in such 
missions. Combining design flexibility with the fact that U.S. companies have made no 
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effort to create a new aircraft in this category, the consortium can also take into 
consideration that the A400 may be the choice of third countries in the future. 
On 4 September 1997, the seven collaborating nations issued a request for a 
proposal for the Future Large Aircraft to AMC. Each nation specified its potential 
requirement in terms of in-service date, number of aircraft, support needs and other 
variables. A competitive RFP was subsequently issued to AMC, Boeing and Lockheed 
Martin on July 1998 seeking tenders at the prime contractor level. In January 1999, 
proposals were received from AMC for the A400M, Lockheed Martin for the C-130J and 
Boeing for the C-17. The final selection basically was gradually made in the year 2000 by 
the participant nations.  
As mentioned previously, the countries will share production. The Airbus 
consortium consists of companies that are the national leaders in the participant countries. 
They are CASA (Spain), Aerospatiale (France), Airbus (a French simplified joint stock 
company with two share holders, European Aeronautic Defense and the Space Company 
(EADS) and BAE-British Aerospace and Marconi Electronics Systems), British 
Aerospace (England), DASA (DaimlerChrysler Aerospace A.G.,Germany), Flabel 
(Belgium) and TAI (Turkey). In 1999, the M138 engine won the down select; and is also 
jointly developed and manufactured by Snecma (France), MTU Munchen (Motoren-und 
Turbinen-Union,Germany), FiatAvio (Italy) and ITP (Industria de Turbo Propulsores 
S.A.,Spain). This is an effort to satisfy the participant’s economic goals as well as using 
the available potential in an affordable manner while also sustaining industrial capability. 
Attention should be paid to the fact that the Airbus Military Company is highly 
influenced by governments. On the other hand, for affordability, the work share is 
distributed according to the capabilities of those national leaders. In other words, the 
program does not have an objective that requires the transfer of technology to participant 
countries which, therefore, makes this project different from co-productions usually 
under offset arrangements. The work share ratios were determined according to the 
number of planes each participant country will be acquiring. According to the Anadolu 
Agency (www.turkishpress.com/turkishpress/news.asp?ID=5242, updated 2/26/2002), 
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the number of planes to be delivered to the participant countries and their work share are 




Country Number of planes Work share of Industries Work share #plane 
Germany   73   37.06    37.24 
France  50   24.74    25.51 
Spain  27   12.49    13.78 
Britain  25   11.84    12.76 
Turkey  10   6.70    5.10 
Belgium  7   5.19    4.08 
Portugal  3   1.99       -- 
Luxembourg 1   5.19    1.53 
As can be seen, the number of planes decreased to 196 from the projected 300 and 
Italy has withdrawn from the program. This is an example of one of the biggest threats to 
international programs. A domino effect is very much feared when participants withdraw 
from the program and then the program becomes seriously threatened by a loss of the 
feasible number of systems being produced. In this case, the feasible number was 180 
A400Ms. However, the first flight was scheduled for 2006 and the first delivery for 2008. 
This issue somehow leads us to another difficulty in international co-development 
arrangements: timeliness. Since every participant country expects to gain by being 
involved in such a program, some participants may drag their feet when they perceive 
subsidiary goals were not achieved. Timeliness may also be harmed by several other 
reasons such as budgetary issues, the different law structures of the participant countries, 
the economic situation of the country, currency and inflation effects or simply one 
participant’s need for the system may not be as urgent/critical as some others for 
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spending funds on it during a certain time frame. The timeliness issue is also a reason 
why participants may withdraw from the program. One of the reasons for Italy’s 
withdrawal from the program and acquisition of the C-130J aircraft may be related to this 
factor. 
B. EUROFIGHTER (EF-2000 TYPHOON) 
At the end of 1980s, many countries were looking at their options for their next 
fighter. Their choices were either to keep operating current aircraft, such as the F-16s or 
F-18 waiting for a more suitable time to acquire a new aircraft incorporating the latest 
available technology such as stealth or buy a new one in that period. Even though life 
extension programs were keeping the present aircraft flying, changing mission 
requirements and emerging new technologies indicated that it was impossible to ignore 
the introduction of new aircraft to the services. The options were then, either to build the 
aircraft on their own or buy it from a traditional supplier, which in many cases was the 
United States. In that time period, different nations, with the ability to design and build an 
aircraft, were working on different designs. Israel had the “Lavi” which ran into 
budgetary problems in 1987 and was cancelled. India’s “Light Combat Aircraft” also had 
funding problems. The former Yugoslavia’s “Novi Avion” project had been thrown into 
doubt by the economic situation. Sweden’s “Saab JAS39 Gripen” was successfully 
completed but there was no potential market like France’s “Rafale” and the United 
State’s’ “Joint Strike Fighter-JSF” which is an example of a success thus far. All these 
examples may lead to the conclusion stated in “Equipping France’s European Fighter”, 
published in Interavia’s 12/89 issue:  
In a fighter program that is controlled nationally, the decision process is 
shorter as there are fewer options and an across-the-board design and 
production capability is assured for a few more years. As everyone knows, 
the major disadvantage is that France must bear the heavy cost of a 
national fighter alone. 
One of the other major challenges besides the R&D and manufacturing costs is 
the difficulty in finding a market for the nationally developed aircraft, especially in 
situations where the producer does not want to reveal core technologies to the buyers 
either within the capabilities of the aircraft or by arrangements as such as off-sets and co-
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productions. Also, all R&D expenses incurred up to that time would be reflected in the 
unit price of the aircraft, which makes it unfeasible for many potential buyers. For these 
reasons, on 16 December 1983, France, then West Germany, Britain, Italy and Spain 
signed an agreement concerning the Future European Combat Aircraft (FEFA). A joint 
requirement was issued on April 1984. The design had been expected to be a twin engine 
but small (therefore inexpensive) aircraft, basically intended to be an air-to-air fighter 
with some ground attack capability. The partner countries were expected to order 800 
aircraft. A search for alternatives and an effort to create combined requirements occurred 
until 1994 with changes in the participant countries. On January 1994, with the European 
Staff Requirement (ESR-D), the Chiefs of Air Staff of Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK 
agreed and signed the operational requirements for the Eurofighter aircraft. In the official 
Eurofighter website (www.eurofighter.com), this process is stated as follows: 
ESR-D specified an extremely agile single seat, twin engined, delta canard 
fighter with optimal performance in both supersonic and sub-sonic regions 
of Beyond-Visual-Range (BVR) and Close-In-Combat, while at the same 
time retaining a very significant Air-to-ground capability. Maximum 
operational effectiveness and flexibility, high survivability, extensive 
technological growth potential as well as high reliability and 
maintainability at low operating costs were defined as the major design 
criteria. 
In this statement, several assurances about the aircraft can be gleaned. The 
statement asserts that this aircraft is economic but without sacrificing performance and 
the aircraft is still a twin engined which usually drives the cost higher. However, a 
comparison should be made about performance to cost versus performance to cost trade 
offs of similar aircraft. Besides, the aircraft is pronounced as being suitable for different 
operations such as air to air, which is the main purpose of the design, and air to ground. 
This optimizes the solution of one aircraft for a variety of missions.  
With the flight test program well underway, the four nations signed a further 
contract in early 1996 in preparation for the production phase. This included a re-
orientation of the requirements of the air forces of the four countries. This also changed 
the work share percentages agreed upon at the beginning of the program. This contract 
ensured the commitments of the participants once again. Since the number of aircraft they 
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required was changing, the participants had been asked to commit their final requirement 
numbers. The final aircraft requirement figures agreed on in January 1996 are: 232 
aircraft, UK-37% work share; 180 aircraft, Germany-30% work share; 121 aircraft Italy-
19% work share; 87 aircraft Spain-14% work share. In January 1998, NETMA (NATO 
Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency), which is the main customer for the 
Eurofighter Weapon System and the Eurofighter GmbH, subsequently signed production 
and support contracts for the initial purchase of 620 aircraft. On 18 September 1998 the 
Supplement 2 agreements to the production contract were signed in Munich, which was a 
fixed-price contract covering the production of the first 148 aircraft. 
In February 1999, the Eurofighter received the request for a proposal from 
Norway, the first nation outside the four partners for 20 aircraft in addition to 10 optional 
aircraft followed by Greece in March 1999 for 60 firm and 30 optional aircraft. 
Several industrial consortiums were set up as part of the project. The Eurofighter 
GmbH was created to manage the development of the complete weapon system. It is 
owned by these four partner companies with agreed upon development work shares of: 
• BAE Systems (BAE-UK)-33% 
• Alenia Aerospazia (Italy)-21% 
• EADS (former DASA, Germany and CASA, Spain)-46% 
Eurojet Turbo GmbH was created by Fiat Aviazioane (Italy), ITP (Spain), MTU-
Munchen (Germany), and Rolls-Royce (UK), to develop the EJ2000 engine. 
Another consortium established for this project is the Euroradar, which is a 
consortium brought together to develop the all-new Captor radar. It is headed by BAE 
Systems (UK), and includes FIAR (Fabbrica Italiana Apparechiature Radioelecttriche, 
Italy), EADS Defence Electronics, and ENOSA (Empresa Nacional de Optica S.A., 
Spain). This is the reaction of the industry to the goals of involved nations and also to 
introduce the benefits of co development/co production to the program. 
As is obvious from these figures, the work share arrangement took into account 
the economic goals of the participant countries with government intervention highly 
visible. Further proof of this statement is provided as the inclusion of Greece in the 
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project is examined. The Hellenic Air Force launched a program for the procurement of 
60 new aircraft with an option for a further 30 aircraft. Following a competition that 
included the F-15, Su-27, the Mirage 2000-5 and the Rafale, the Eurofighter was selected 
to meet this requirement at a meeting of the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee on 
March 2000. The Eurofighter has offered Greece a full partnership in the program 
combined with a substantial industrial participation program. As part of the contract 
arrangement and inter-Government agreements, Greece will become a full partner in the 
NATO Eurofighter Management Organization. The Eurofighter will continue to maintain 
strong contact with Greece in an effort to determine options for a reasonable solution to 
future budget issues and alternative payment plans within existing constraints. Offering 
the Greek Industry future work as well as the ability to have a say in future variations to 
the aircraft design created the market. When taking consideration that this program, with 
around 150 first and second line suppliers, a total of 400 companies and 150,000 people 
involved over the next 20 years in the development and production of the aircraft, this 
offer seems to be a significant incentive. 
Another interesting procedure regarding the goals of participant nations was that 
the test flights of the seven prototypes, named starting from DA1 (Development Aircraft 
number one) to DA7 (Development Aircraft number seven), were also shared among the 
participants. In 1994, the first prototype, the DA1, flew from Munich (Germany). The 
second, the DA2, in the same year, flew from Warton (England). In 1995, the DA3 flew 
from Caselle (Italy). In 1996, the DA6 twin seat, flew from Getafe (Spain). In 1997, the 
DA7 from Caselle (Italy), the DA5 from Manching (Germany) and the DA4 from Warton 
(England) were flown to test components and tactics such as radar, hardened shelter 
compatibility, air-to-air refueling, modified nose, and lightning strike trials. By 
September 2000, the seven development aircraft had logged a total of more than 1,300 
flying hours and well over 1,400 test sorties. There were many examples of this 
procedure before and especially within NATO. The problem was, nearly all the 
participants requested the establishment of such an expensive facility in their country 
since every country envisions many future benefits in having a test facility. Some of the 
benefits foreseen by having such a facility are access to technology, training of national 
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scientists/engineers, generation of high paying jobs to the most educated work force, and 
possibility of future R&D jobs, all at the expense of the partnership. 
The Eurofighter is now in full production and will enter into service in 2002. The 
four partner nations have ordered 620 aircraft while Greece has committed to 60 with an 
option for a further 30 aircraft. Norway did not make any commitments.  
Eurofighter International (EFI) based in London, is the dedicated export sales and 
marketing arm for the Eurofighter Typhoon program and is responsible for export sales. 
The industrial partner scheme applied to Greece is open to all export customers. Through 
NETMA (NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency), which was responsible 
for only Tornados prior to the Typhoon, the partnership is able to utilize the experience 
gained thus far. However, as is obvious, finding markets for any expensive major weapon 
system is a bigger challenge in today’s environment. 
C. MEDIUM EXTENDED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM (MEADS) 
During the Cold War, the two powers were balancing their ballistic missiles 
capabilities by maintaining a similar numbers of missiles. However, the technology 
spread to countries other than the two powers and especially right after the collapse of the 
USSR. Much of the work force experienced in nuclear, biological and chemical weapons 
production as well as ballistic missile technology looked for countries, that would 
welcome their knowledge; it was obvious that the former Soviet Union would no longer 
be able to support their programs. Many ended up in non-developed or developing 
countries. These countries, not possessing large, armed forces spread worldwide and with 
little global influence, had an incentive to own and maintain ballistic missiles to achieve 
their political goals or just to present a considerable threat when religious differences 
were an issue. Mass destruction capability would also deter some of the organizations 
such as NATO and United Nations from interfering in conflicts for humanitarian and 
similar reasons since these organizations would not tolerate casualties. This threat 
dictated that troops on the field as well as cities and potential strategic/tactical targets 
should be defended. Two types of changing threats were addressed in “Perestroika Factor 
in Western Air Defense Systems” by Brian Wanstall (Interavia, Issue 3/1989): 
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…the traditional one of large numbers of high-speed combat aircraft 
supported by jamming devices and terrain-fallowing high-subsonic and 
supersonic cruise missiles accompanied by diving tactical and anti-radar 
missiles. These will be accurate enough to hit NATO SAM sites, airfields 
and other key targets in forward and rear areas, plus the port facilities so 
vital to the NATO reinforcement plan. 
An eight nation project group of the Independent European Planning Group 
(IEPG), consisting of members of NATO, has been studying future medium-range 
surface-to-air missile (MSAM) requirements and developing European Staff Target 
outline. In August 1988, the eight countries (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, the UK and Belgium) signed a Memorandum of Understanding for a 
joint one-year MSAM study in association with industry. However, at the same time, 
many of these countries were working on and funding their own solutions. Former West 
Germany was partly funding the development of an Advanced Tactical PATRIOT under 
the terms of a U.S.-German Memorandum Of Understanding on air defense along with its 
own national MSAM project, the Taktisches Luft-Verteidigungs-System (TLVS). France 
and Italy were working together for the development of SAAM, a ship borne Surface to 
Air Anti-Missile system, which they were proposing as a joint feasibility study with the 
UK and Spain. France had already been committed to the land version of the system that 
would use the ASTER missile system for anti-missile capability. At the same time, Spain 
and the UK were proposing the LAMS-Local Area Anti-missile System. In 1989, the UK 
also announced their own anti-tactical ballistic missile system, the WOLVERINE. The 
U.S. was working on a PAC-3 upgrade of the PATRIOT system as well as considering a 
life extension program for the HAWK system that would extend into 2010. 
On the Safe Foundation’s website (www.safefoundation.org/tech/local.asp) 
threats and requirements are addressed as follows: 
Increasing existing threats of tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs) and cruise 
missiles against ground forces deployed in combat theater affect US and 
allied forces alike. MEADS role in the ballistic missile defense 
architecture will be to bridge the gap between man portable systems like 
the Stinger and the higher level missile defenses like PATRIOT Advanced 
Capability-3 (PAC-3) or the Theater High Altitude Area Defense 
(THAAD) system. 
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Also, in the Facts Sheet (BMDO Fact Sheet 210-00-11), the U.S. DoD published, 
on November 2000, the requirements and the solutions, which are defined as follows: 
In the coming decades, NATO is likely to become increasingly engaged in 
maintaining and restoring regional peace, often in an international 
coalition. To undertake this mission with the greatest chance of success, 
NATO forces must be able to rapidly deploy to regional crises, work with 
allied forces, conduct fast moving ground combat, and protect themselves 
from air and missile attack. 
The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization’s (BDMO) Medium Extended 
Air Defense System (MEADS) program, previously referred to as Corps 
Surface to Air Missile , is specifically designed to satisfy the requirement 
for limited area defense and the protection of maneuver forces against the 
increasing threat of tactical ballistic missiles and air-breathing targets, 
including cruise missiles. 
The description of the system follows. MEADS will be a highly mobile (mounted 
on wheeled vehicles) with a low to medium altitude air defense system designed to 
ensure protection of maneuver forces. The system will use a multi-canister vertical 
launcher. Advanced radars will provide 360 degree coverage and missiles will be hit-to-
kill and used against missiles as well as air breathing targets. MEADS will use a 
distributed/netted architecture that will allow a MEADS unit to be task organized and 
configured to address a variety of threats and tactics. A key element of the system will be 
transportability on C-130 aircraft. MEADS will replace the HAWK and some portion of 
the PATRIOT system. According to a document published on Director Operational Test 
& Evaluation’s website (www.dote.osd.mil/reports/FY00/other/oomeads.html), the 
system will contribute to three of the four Joint Vision 2020 operational concepts of 
precision engagement, full-dimensional protection and dominant maneuver forces. 
The MEADS’s U.S. origin dates back to the Corps SAM (Surface to Air Missile 
System) project of the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. Corps SAM, a joint Army and 
Marine Corps program, was intended to replace the rapidly aging HAWK air defense 
system (in service since the early 1960’s). The Army and Marine Corps started Corps 
SAM in recognition of their common need to find a new rapidly deployable air defense 
system against air and theater short to medium range missiles. 
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In the early 1990s, Germany expressed an interest in joining the Corps SAM 
program and cooperating on system development and production. Like the U.S., the 
German interest stemmed from a need to replace aging HAWK systems. Soon afterwards, 
France and then Italy, came forward to express their interest in joining. In February 1995, 
a joint Statement of Intent (SOI) was signed between the four nations. At this point, 
Corps SAM became officially known as MEADS. The SOI would form the basis of a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) defining the details of the cooperation for each 
phase of the three phases. The phases were Project Development and Validation (PD-V), 
which was to produce a system specification, a primary end item specification and a 
cooperative program plan for common development and production, Design and 
Development (D&D), the phase in which actual design work and tests was to be 
conducted, and Production, in which actual manufacturing work was to be done. The SOI 
called for a program cost and work share of approximately 50% for the U.S., 20% each 
for France and Germany, and 10% for Italy. The SOI also laid out the method to manage 
the procurement process. A multilateral Steering Committee would supervise the soon to 
be established NATO MEADS Management Agency that would provide program 
oversight. France dropped out of the project before the signing of the MOU. According to 
the tailored agreement, for the first phase, the position General Manager would rotate 
between the remaining two European participants. Germany was to provide the first 
General Manager. The U.S. would provide the Deputy General Manager. Additional 
NATO countries were allowed to join the MEADS effort if all participating countries 
approved. The SOI also detailed the process that would be used to choose a contracting 
team to build the system. The process paired two U.S. teams, one led by Hughes and 
Raytheon and the other by Lockheed Martin, with two European teams, each comprised 
of Daimler-Benz, Siemens, and Alenia. An MOU would be negotiated for each of the 
three phases.  
The first MOU was signed in May 1996 to commence the Project Definition-
Validation (PD-V) phase, the first of three phases planned to field the system. The U.S. 
and its remaining European partners, Germany and Italy, agreed to split work shares and 
development costs by a ratio of 60% for US, 25% for Germany and 15% for Italy, 
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although each party had only made commitments to the PD-V phase as stated in the SOI. 
In June 1996, the Management Organization charter was established under NATO. 
Before transitioning from the PD-V to the D&D phase, on 19 May 1999, the 
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, basically a predecessor of Independent European 
Planning Group and the NATO MEADS Organization, announced the selection of 
MEADS International as the prime contractor, a joint venture comprised of Lockheed 
Martin of the U.S., DaimlerChrysler Aerospace AG of Germany and Alenia Marconi 
Systems of Italy. Also, a three year Risk Reduction Phase before entering a full D&D 
phase was planned. 
In this project, the tendency had always been towards a cooperative effort even 
though many of the countries had their own solutions. This was because the system had 
to be highly compatibility with the allied nations’ systems, and high cost of the system, 
no national solution was acceptable to the others. As stated in the Congressional 
Testimony of Brigadier General Emery, USAF, Deputy for Theater and Air Missile 
Defense Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to the House National Security 
Committee, Subcommittee on Research & Development and Procurement on 19 March 
1997 (http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html/emery.html): 
…In addition, US forces will likely be fighting alongside coalition 
partners. Therefore, we must be prepared to fight not just jointly, but with 
combined forces as well. In some cases, the first TMD (Tactical Missile 
Defense) systems in a theater of operations may be those of allies and 
friends. Hence, TMD systems require strong levels of interoperability 
between US, allied and friendly systems…New development programs are 
expensive and unilateral development and fielding sometimes makes them 
unaffordable. Through international cooperative development programs, 
such as MEADS, true burden sharing allows us to field highly effective 
defensive systems with our allies in a more affordable manner. 
Affordability and interoperability are the main areas of focus. However, 
affordability did not completely justify accepting a system that was nationally developed 
by one of the partners. The solution found to ensure commitment to the project was again 
a work share agreement. In burden sharing arrangements, participants used another very 
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common method, that of sharing depending on the number of systems to be procured. 
Also, heavy government intervention, as in many other projects, was present. 
Although, PATRIOT PAC-3 was finally selected as the core of the MEADS 
project, this was not without controversy. Bernd W. Kubbig, from the Free University of 
Berlin, Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt, voiced some of the concerns in his remarks 
prepared for the Forum Ballistic Missile Defense, Berlin, 18 September 2000 under the 
name “The Problematic Trilateral Project MEADS”. He claimed that from the beginning 
the project had been disliked by the majority of the U.S. Congress and not supported by 
the Pentagon and the military because funding for MEADS from the U.S. had been little 
and unstable. Funding concerns were also addressed in the Brigadier General Emery’s 
congressional testimony on the strength of the international coalition in developing such a 
system within the needs to respond to financial constraints on the defense budget. 
Furthermore, Mr. B. W. Kubbig points to his source, a MEADS report by the U.S. 
General Accounting Office (GAO), June 1988. He also continues to claim that the 
PATRIOT PAC-3, being the focus of the system, meant adhering to the “Buy American 
Act”, as stated by a representative of the German Ministry of Defense: 
The U.S., in our meetings has become quite explicit that PAC-3 is the 
solution and we can agree to co-development only if we accept PAC-3 as 
the core. 
Mr. Kubbig continues with the issue of the transfer of technological data. 
According to the GAO Report, a release approval of the data had taken as long as 259 
days, which urged the participants to demand that the following conditions be met by the 
U.S. before the next phase of cooperation could start. MEADS had to be a NATO 
program, how the transfer of information was to be handled had to be clearly outlined, 
data on the interceptor (PAC-3) had to be made accessible to the greatest extent possible, 
and MEADS had to be developed in such a way as to yield a fully-operational system. 
Following these concerns, the U.S. developed a plan to share missile defense technology 
with the two European partners.  
As seen from these statements, sharing information is one of the greatest issues 
when a participant country sees the information it possesses as a national security issue as 
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well as, most probably, a core competency within the defense market. Another concern 
was that if the U.S. chose to integrate the system with its National Missile Defense 
project, all the components of the system would be U.S. technology which would harm 
the economic goal of European participants. Such systems being compatible with 
international agreements, such as the “Demarcation Agreement” signed between Russia 
and the U.S., would also be a concern. 
Last, but not least, such international structures might prevent contractors from 
pursuing the most cost-effective systems. Sub-contracting, in many cases, will be limited 
within the participant countries and the approval cycle of more cost effective sources 
outside the partnership will take longer. In some cases, it would take so long that the 
entire program would be placed in jeopardy. 
D JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER (JSF) 
During the same timeframe, while the European Nations were attempting to 
define their next fighter aircraft, the U.S. was also working on an affordable joint 
solution. The U.S. had to replace an aging aircraft in the inventories of the Air Force, 
Navy and the Marine Corps. The Air Force needed to replace F-16s, and therefore, 
needed an agile, fighter bomber small enough to be affordable, but designed to use the 
latest available technology such as stealth. The Navy needed an aircraft which 
complements the F-18s, and wanted to have access to stealth technology especially after 
the unsuccessful attempt in the A-12 case. The Marine Corps, like the UK Navy, was 
looking for a replacement for the A-8, a short takeoff vertical landing aircraft. Since the 
concept is different from the Eurofighter, the JSF existed for a different market. The 
Eurofighter is basically an advanced interceptor with two engines for high 
maneuverability, which in bombing missions, because of G/drag limits, would not be a 
priority. 
In a market analysis published in the Defense-i.com (www.defense-i.com), the 
JSF is described as follows: 
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) will be multi-role fighter, capable of 
carrying out ground strike-missions, interception and patrol, while making 
use of the latest advances in stealth technology, weapon systems and 
computer communication. 
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As stated, the JSF will be a single engine stealth fighter-bomber. It will have the 
capability of carrying external loads (losing stealth capability) as well as internal weapon 
bays. Three types will be manufactured: the conventional type (CTOL) for the Air 
Forces, the short take-off/vertical landing (STOVL) types for the Marine Corps and the 
UK services, and the carrier model (CV). It will have an Advanced Electronically 
Scanned Array (AESA) radar which will support air-to-air, air-to-surface and electronic 
warfare operations. A common engine, the Pratt & Whitney F135 (JSF version of F119), 
was chosen as the propulsion system. 
The program started as The Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) program. 
The U.S. Secretary of Defense’s Bottom-up Review in 1993 acknowledged the need to 
affordably replace aging strike assets in order to maintain the military’s technological 
edge, and consequently established the JAST program. The program is jointly manned 
and funded. Legislation merged the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) and 
Advanced Short Take Off/Vertical Landing (ASTOVL) program with JAST. JAST 
inherited much of the defunct A/F-X project as well as combining with the ARPA’s X-32 
project and thus received the name JSF.  
The X-32 started as ARPA’s ASTOVL project, and was intended as a technology 
demonstrator leading to a supersonic successor to the Harrier (A-8). The latter became 
the Common Advanced Lightweight Fighter (CALF). It was a more general demonstrator 
for a future lightweight fighter. The UK was also involved in the project and contributed 
about one third of the money. This relationship ensured the UK’s current position of full-
collaborative partner status offered only to the UK by a MOU signed on 20 December 
1995. The UK participated $200 million to the Concept Demonstration Phase. 
The JSF program completed its Concept Exploration Phase in December 1994. 
The results of that phase underscored the possibility and benefit of commonality as a 
viable means of achieving significant savings in next-generation aircraft. The key 
conclusion was that a family of aircraft could meet tri-service needs with an significant 
overall Life Cycle Cost savings. The main emphasis of this project was affordability. In 
fact, by using cost as an independent variable and addressing a common solution, in the 
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main frame and mainly sub component level, the project attempted to shorten the tail. Mr. 
England, Secretary of the Navy (2002) addressed in his speech given at NPS.  
The U.S. JAST program was intended to be a technology-development program 
rather than an actual service aircraft. It involved all the improvements that would be 
expected from a next generation aircraft such as advanced materials, stealth, reduced 
costs, and better systems integration, in addition to two particularly innovative concept: 
The first is modular aircraft design so that individual aircraft could be built with 
different combinations of components for different services and missions, such as take-
off capability. The same basic airframe could be built in conventional runway versions 
for the Air Force, carrier-borne versions for the Navies, and the V/STOL version for the 
Marine Corps and Navies.  
The second is providing a virtual reality environment for the pilot which would 
integrate network-provided tactical information with the outside view. 
Twelve technology development contracts were awarded in May 1994 with the 
largest going to Boeing. Two contractor teams out of Lockheed, McDonnell 
Douglas/Northrop and Boeing would each build two demonstrators. 
In May 1996, the JSF was designated an Acquisition Category I, DoD acquisition 
program. In June, the weapon system prime contractors submitted their Concept 
Demonstration Phase (CDP) proposals. A formal Milestone I Acquisition Decision 
Memorandum was signed by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & 
Technology) on 15 November 1996, clearing the way for the award of CDP prime 
contracts to Boeing and Lockheed Martin on 16 November 1996. The Pentagon gave 
Boeing and Lockheed Martin $1.4 billion each to take their best shots at designing the 
fighter. 
Two prototypes would be built, representing both conventional, carrier capable 
and STOVL versions with the first operational fighter planned to roll out in 2008. Around 
3,000 aircraft were foreseen to be demanded by the U.S.,U.K. and potential third country 
customers. The program would consist of three phases: Concept Demonstration Phase 
(CDP), Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase (E&MD), and Full 
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Production Phase. Distribution of the aircraft to the participating countries would be 
made on an equal basis. In other words, every participating country would receive a 
portion of their order basically at the same time. Participation in each of the phases would 
be optional and required a certain fee be paid according to the level of participation. 
Furthermore, participant countries would obtain a percentage of the sales to third 
countries that was determined according to their level of participation. Industry 
participation would be on a sub-contractor to the chosen prime basis and the country 
industry share would be based on competition, unlike most other international projects. 
Finally, on October 26, 2001, the Defense Department selected Lockheed Martin's 
F-35 as the winner of the competition to manufacture the Joint Strike Fighter. The UK 
and, on 7 February 2002, Canada, announced their participation in this phase. According 
to the Military Library Database (Dudley Knox Library web page, www.nps.navy.mil-
02/07/2002), Canada’s commitment for the next ten years will be $150 million. Also, the 
Netherlands, Italy, Norway, Denmark and Turkey expressed interest in participating in 
that phase. 
International involvement in the program was also a method to create an 
affordable aircraft when considering efficiency and burden sharing and as a secondary 
benefit of doing the market research from the beginning when the level of participation 
and willingness of the countries is taken into account. The JSF program would 
incorporate as many international participants as practical. The Program Office created a 
framework for international cooperation that had four levels. 
• Collaborative Development Partner: A full partner greatly influencing 
design and having access to all efforts 
• Associate Partners: Limited partners with limited participation in specific 
technologies or core programs 
• Informed Customers: Allowed information on JSF processes to permit 
them to evaluate the utility of the JSF family of aircraft for their use but 
were unable to influence requirements 
• Foreign Industry: would be able to participate under a ‘Fee-for-Service’ 
category by subcontracting to U.S. primes for subsequent phases of the 
program. Russian, British and French firms participated at this level. 
The participant countries and their status of participation are discussed as follows: 
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• A multi-lateral MOA with Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands was 
successfully negotiated in October 1996 
• A MOA was signed by the U.S., Norway, and the Netherlands in June 
1997 
• A MOA was signed by Denmark in September 1997 
Countries have entered the program as Associate Partners: 
• Negotiations with Canada were completed in May 1997. A MOU was 
signed in December 1997.  Canadians entered the program as Informed 
Partners in January 1998. 
• Italy signed a MOA on 23 December 1998 for participation in the JSF 
Program as an Informed Partner. Italian cooperation covers several carrier 
suitability and environmental projects for JSF during the current phase of 
the program. 
• Singapore signed a Letter of Acceptance (LOA) on 20 March 1999 to 
become a Major Participant 
• Turkey became a Major Participant on 16 June 1999 
• Israel signed its Letter of Offer and Acceptance on 23 September 1999 to 
become a major participant 
Except for the UK, all the participants participated as 3rd levels. 
On the JSF official website, the advantages for international participants are 
declared as follows: 
• Access to JSF Program information to assist in determining if the JSF 
meets national requirements for a strike fighter 
• Use of modeling and simulation tools to assist in requirement validation 
effort 
• Conduit for foreign industry to engage U.S. industry in the formation of 
future partnerships 
• Bridge to possible participation in future phases of JSF (e.g. Engineering 
& Manufacturing Development, Production) 
• Influence requirements if mutually beneficial to participants 
One other reason for the expectation that this international program will be 
successful is that the acquisition of this particular aircraft from U.S. Services is 
absolutely dependent on participation in the program. Therefore, participants do not want 
to lose the potential benefits to be obtained from this program. This is supported by the 
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idea that the JSF will be the only affordable stealth fighter-bomber for the next 20 to 30 
years and these countries will be acquiring this aircraft one way or another. 
The program was also regarded as a pilot project to see if the new concepts such 
as technology maturation, cost as an independent variable, joint weapon systems, 
modular design and international involvement would work. On the Defense-i’s web page, 
there is an interesting observation about aircraft industry consolidation. 
As a result of mergers and acquisitions over the past ten years, the total 
number of prime manufacturers of military fixed-wing aircraft has 
declined. So rapidly has the defense industry shrunk in recent years that 
‘consolidation’ sometimes seemed a polite way of saying ‘collapse’ as one 
famous name after the other disappeared into a black hole. But for the 
aerospace sector, the implosion is almost complete. What has survived is a 
surprisingly healthy business. 
What may be most remarkable about the consolidation of the industry is 
that the customer (the Pentagon) kept its hands off. Instead of urging 
particular companies to join with another, which it might have justified as 
essential for national security, the Pentagon effectively left them to sort it 
out. They did, and it worked. 
Although the statement renders powerful substantiation of this idea, the actions of 
the U.S. cannot be expected from many other countries. The U.S., being a major weapons 
exporter, could leave the aircraft industry adjust by itself within market rules since the 
industry was strong enough to survive after the struggle. Boeing, being a major supplier 
in world civilian airplane market and recently landing the big transport aircraft contract 
for the C-17, had enough capital and future work to survive. On the other hand, 
Lockheed-Martin was a big player in the fighter aircraft arena and their latest contract 
was the F-22. Although both firms divested many of their divisions in different areas, 
their situation was strong enough to react to the changes. However, in other nations, the 
national aircraft industry had no chance of surviving whatsoever without government 
subsidies. The biggest European firm, Airbus, had been subsidized many times in many 
forms such as being the first choice of European nations when acquiring transport 
aircraft. 
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The JSF was also important as the largest potential aircraft contract for the U.S., 
UK and other countries in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the JSF program would be 
conducted under the DoD’s acquisition reform initiatives begun in 1994. These initiatives 
mandated a new way of doing business, cancelled many government standards and 
specifications and stated the service’s needs in performance-based terms and thus 
welcoming many new concepts as previously mentioned. In the “JSF Program 
Whitepaper”, the Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) concept is mentioned: 
To an unprecedented degree the JSF Program is using cost-performance 
trades early, as an integral part of the weapon system development 
process, to enable achievement of an affordable mission effective solution 
to the Service’s needs. The services are defining requirements through an 
iterative process, balancing weapon system capability against life cycle 
cost at every stage. Each iteration of requirements is provided to industry. 
They evolve their designs and provide cost data to the war fighters. The 
war fighters then evaluate trades and make decisions for the next iteration. 
Furthermore, the technology maturation concept, demonstrating that technology is 
established prior to E&MD in order to reduce cost and risk, has been a key element. In 
the GAO’s Report about Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition (GAO/NSIAD-00-74, May 
2000) this issue is addressed as follows: 
Matching the aircraft requirements and the maturity of technology as a 
program begins is perhaps the most important determinant of a program’s 
success. Once a program begins, a large, fixed investment in the form of 
human capitol, facilities and materials is sunk into the program and any 
significant changes will have a large, rippling effect on schedule and cost. 
In the case of critical technologies, beginning an acquisition program 
when the technologies are at a low level of development increases 
program risk and the likelihood of schedule delays, which increases 
program costs. 
Other cost reduction concepts are the family of aircraft concept and having a 
modular design to adapt an interchangeable assembly plant for affordability and mission 
effective solutions for each service’s needs. Cost reductions result from using a flexible 
manufacturing approach and common subsystems to gain economies of scale. Emphasis 
is on commonality in the higher priced parts. This concept is also expected to create huge 
savings from common depot maintenance, commonly supported logistics as well as 
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increased service interoperability. Performance based contracting is defining the desired 
performance rather than telling the contractor how to do it, and thus giving the contractor 
flexibility as well as allowing cost-capability trade-offs in a wider aspect. From the 
beginning, development savings from the JSF family of aircraft approach compared to 
three separate programs for each service are estimated to be nearly 40%. 
The U.S. Air Force will be the largest JSF customer and will purchase 1763 
CTOL aircraft. The U.S. Marine Corps is expected to purchase 609 STOVL aircraft, and 
the U.S. Navy about 480 CV aircraft. The U.K. Royal Air Force and Royal Navy will 
purchase 150 of the STOVL aircraft. The purchases of participating and third countries 
have not yet cleared. 
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III. GENERALIZATION OF PROBLEMS AND LESSONS 
LEARNED FROM THE EXAMPLE PROJECTS 
This chapter will define the issues, concerns and solutions implemented that were 
extracted from the example projects. Many of the issues within the chosen projects were 
similar since all of the chosen examples are Acquisition Category I, major weapon 
system projects and in many cases the participant countries are the same. Besides, such 
projects involve large investments, new technologies and major impacts on both national 
security and economic dimensions. Governments therefore will actively influence these 
programs. This chapter will not attempt to explain participant motives in detail; the 
motives will not only encompass efficiency and economy, but also the political climate at 
that time. Thus, every project and every participant country could have been investigated 
in terms of national political and economic history, as well as the history of the 
organizations such as NATO. 
Five issues associated with the example projects will likely be issues in future 
international co-development programs. These are technology, security, economic, and 
industry issues plus R&D/burden/production sharing. 
A. TECHNOLOGY RELATED ISSUES 
All Defense Departments want to provide war fighters with weapon systems that 
embody the latest available technology. It is a proven fact, seen especially during the 
Gulf War and the conflicts occurring afterwards, that there is very low tolerance for 
casualties today. Therefore, it is necessary to provide technologically more complicated 
systems to the war fighters, but of course at a price. In fact, providing the latest 
technology to war fighters was the strategy of the U.S. and NATO, while the former 
USSR and the Warsaw Pact were depended more on mass attack with a lot of armor. The 
technologically advanced weapons needed were acquired by the participant nations in 
two ways. The superpowers were able to develop their own but many countries did not 
have the required level of industry and knowledge to do that; so they purchased weapon 
systems through Foreign Military Sales channels. In developing their own method, 
nations were depending on sales to other countries to obtain a break-even level of 
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production. In many cases, that number would not be reached because nations capable of 
doing so preferred to develop their own weapon systems. Buyers also wanted to be 
independent in national security related matters, had national economic and political 
goals, and also had concerns about technology transfer and industrial capabilities. Buying 
from another nation raises the concerns and problems previously mentioned. Weapon 
systems are acquired with a support package. Buyer nations will be seek cheaper ways to 
acquire that support, hopefully with an approach that would involve and improve their 
own industry. Offset, technology transfer and co-production type arrangements are some 
of the solutions implemented to satisfy those concerns. However, these arrangements 
depend on whether the buyer is a developed, developing or underdeveloped country. 
Co-development arrangements are usually done between developed and 
developing countries as we saw in the chosen examples in this thesis, for several reasons. 
First, the industry of underdeveloped countries cannot accommodate effective production 
of large, complex weapon systems. Many firms from these countries do not compete in 
the weapon systems market even at the sub-contractor level. Their participation will 
depend on the transfer of many advanced technologies. However, in many cases, these 
countries do not buy enough systems to justify transferring the technology. Besides, the 
source country may not be willing to transfer the technology. The technology may end up 
in another country that is not politically favored by the source. The likelihood of this 
happening is a greater risk since underdeveloped countries also have economic concerns. 
In the Eurofighter program, if participant countries are approved up to the approved level, 
third countries are promised participation in the production, probably with a technology 
transfer arrangement. However, current participants simply will not approve participation 
of a technologically unsatisfactory third country. They are only offering production 
participation because the design is already in place. The FLA program is tailored to 
satisfy the operational needs of the participant countries as well as addressing solely 
using the European Aeronautics Industry. Besides, the program addressed interoperability 
within NATO forces. That may be a concern when a non-NATO nation considers FLA. 
When looking at the work share arrangements in all these programs, participant nations 
competed according to their industrial and technical capabilities. Thus, there is no 
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foreseeable enlargement that includes technology transfer to another country in the near 
future. Likewise, MEADS was designed in ways that may not fit the requirements of a 
third country. The program had problems with knowledge transfer among the current 
participants, and therefore does not present an example of easy access to technology. JSF 
may be the most suitable program among the examples that can fit the requirements of a 
non-participant nation. The program does not promise an economic return, but points to 
potential return in early involvement. This approach is expected to drive costs down, and 
thereby resulting in a more affordable aircraft.  
Developing countries have experience in production and development of complex 
systems because of earlier exposure to co-production, licensing and/or offset 
arrangements. Turkey and Greece are some of the countries in this category. It is easier to 
transfer technology because these countries have most of the technical background as 
well as skilled personnel needed. Their participation may necessitate some degree of 
support, but they are more cost efficient in many cases. The program may reduce costs 
considerably, especially those related to labor as an educated labor’s opportunity cost is 
usually lower than in the developed countries. These countries are economically more 
stable. Therefore, in the long run, transferred technology and knowledge may be used in 
other areas, independent of the subject program that frees both sides (source and 
participants) from obligations to maintain the industrial base. This is also helpful when 
other co-development arrangements are considered with the same country. Knowing how 
to cooperate is as important as being willing to cooperate. Countries in this status have 
expertise in this area. Furthermore, such countries are already cooperating with 
developed countries because they are usually members of organizations such as NATO. 
Co-development arrangements between developed countries are sometimes harder 
to implement. Arrangements are usually made to share technology that other participants 
did not have or are not as effective in implementing. Efficiency and savings are achieved 
by not reinventing the wheel. While one of the participants has the technology for the 
wheel, the other has the axle and the main purpose is to share this technology in order to 
build the car. In some cases, countries do not want to share the technology they possess 
as they feel that they may lose a core competency in the market and therefore lead to a 
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loss of future jobs. National industry champions will be involved in the project. Their 
approach to economic goals will necessitate the involvement of politics, thus leading to 
government intervention. At that point, efficiency may no longer be a high priority. If one 
party feels another is slow to share knowledge, the entire program could be in jeopardy. 
Participants may appear to act as if the main purpose of the program is not to field an 
operable system but to gain access to technology others possess. 
The chosen example programs in this thesis are all co-development programs 
between developed and developing countries. Some of these aforementioned issues can 
be seen in these projects. In MEADS, Germany accused the U.S. of not releasing enough 
knowledge on time. FLA was addressing the technological capacity of the European 
Nations. When Italy decided to leave the program, other nations luckily had the capacity 
and technology to assume for the Italian work share. With the Eurofighter, every 
participant nation had its own aircraft design, but they could dedicate their resources to a 
common solution. This was achieved by recognizing the forte of the other nations. The 
JSF program is introducing a stealth aircraft to the market. Up to now, only the U.S. used 
that technology. There is also a very famous example of failure: the U.S. Navy’s A-12. 
The A-12 was supposed to be a stealth carrier based aircraft for the Navy. However, the 
program did not receive enough support from the U.S. Air Force, which had the expertise 
and knowledge in this field. The program was abandoned and much money was lost. The 
reasons for failure were not the same but are good examples of what might have been 
achieved if knowledge had been transferred to the Navy program. When thinking in terms 
of international programs, this particular technology would naturally be guarded by the 
U.S. (the fact that only the U.S. used and was known to use stealth technology may 
justify this behavior). Besides, the U.S. is the only country that can currently implement 
the technology efficiently when taking learning curves into consideration. 
In general, international co-development may help realize affordable, 
interoperable, and advanced weapon systems. This is because defense budgets are not 
large enough for most countries to be experts in every required technology, nor it is 
probable that they will be efficient in implementing them. Instead of struggling to 
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improve in every area, cooperating to share talents seems a win-win situation for the 
participants. It may very well help in fielding the weapon systems discussed earlier. 
B. SECURITY ISSUES 
In some situations, countries do not want to share information with other 
countries, even if they are cooperating to some extent. This may occur for several 
reasons. The source country may feel threatened if a likely competitor obtains access to a 
key technology. The danger of losing a portion of their market share may lead them to act 
in such a way. Besides, all defense issues are affected by politics. Nations are cooperating 
with nations deemed to be politically close to them. Third party access is strictly 
controlled. Through the end of the Cold War, industrial espionage was regarded as a great 
danger. Reverse engineering was not uncommon. However, most of that concern today is 
a result of economic interests. Governments may resort to extreme measures to preserve 
key technologies. Furthermore, a national defense industry, independent from other 
countries, although not possible in a global environment, still is a dream of many 
governments.  
Even though the Cold War is over, there are many other threats that can 
necessitate extensive security measures. One example is terrorism, which knows no 
boundaries. Others are ethnic conflicts in which neither friend nor foe can be clearly 
defined, unstable governments owning ballistic missiles, and easily produced chemical 
and biological weapons. In general, nations behave according to the principle “No eternal 
enemies, no eternal foes”. They are picky in choosing which nations to cooperate with 
and consider the circumstances that may occur in the future. This future could last as long 
as 25 to 35 years over the life cycle of a weapon system. Being attached to a country even 
at a sub-component level today may lead to vulnerability tomorrow. Therefore, co-
development partners are usually also seen as strategic allies. In all the example projects 
chosen, participant nations were related to each other through NATO, Europe, the 
European Union or some other strategic alliances. FLA involves European nations that 
are also partners in NATO. The Eurofighter involves European Nations in European 
Union. MEADS participants are NATO countries already involved in a key part of the 
PATRIOT system. The U.S. is certainly inviting countries that are politically close to 
 34
participate in the JSF project. Besides, it is usual practice to include a clause in the 
weapon system sales contract making it mandatory to obtain the approval of the source 
country before selling the system to a third party. Almost all the participation MOU’s 
requires the approval of existing participants when a new country’s participation is 
considered (even if they are customers). 
The global environment forces nations to be more flexible in sharing information. 
Shrinking defense budgets requires nations to seek more efficient ways to satisfy the 
needs of the war fighters. However, security procedures pose a considerable barrier to 
seeking that efficiency through international co-development efforts. For example, it is 
very unlikely that the U.S. and China will be involved in a co-developed weapon system 
program in the near future. The precise ownership of data is not clear even between the 
same country’s government and industry. As mentioned in the technology issues section, 
the possibility of technology ending up in a politically unfriendly country and the 
possibility of reverse engineering push the source countries towards the “black box” 
approach. Solutions implemented so far were full communication and show of intent. 
Participants should put the desired rules on the table at the earliest stage to mitigate 
potential future conflicts, which always delay the program for months or in some cases 
result in its complete abandonment. This approach may necessitate sacrificing a 
nationally supported solution as happened with MEADS. Italy, the U.S. and Germany 
had their own solutions for a common need but no participant was willing to accept the 
others solution. In the end, participant nations decided on the requirements and design 
features from scratch. 
In some cases, sharing knowledge does not harm the source. As the source 
country usually offers the most efficient way of implementing that knowledge; and, the 
competition from other countries may never be significant when the learning curve is 
considered. Finally, the examples also prove that international partnerships usually occur 
between the nations belonging to the same organization or already having a strategic 




C. ECONOMIC ISSUES 
The stability of a program is directly related to its funding. A large weapon 
system program may both be a huge expense and at the same generate revenue for a 
nation. This section will discuss the economic issues in two dimensions. First is the 
availability of a participant’s economic resources. Second is the economic expectations 
and goals that motivate the country’s decision to participate in a program. 
Several programs proved that the cost and schedule of R&D programs could not 
be precisely predicted. Many times contingency funding and schedule extensions are 
needed. It is many times not preferred to stop an R&D effort after the program has 
received a lot of money. Program managers, especially when their careers depend on 
program’s success, will be motivated to try to make the authorities believe that if a little 
more funding is released, the program will be a success. However, when there is 
international involvement, much effort is needed to have more funds released. The 
budgeting systems in many countries are more or less similar. Almost all the systems 
practice a period based approach and available resources are allocated in five year, two 
year or yearly plans. Usually there is very limited flexibility for contingencies. No matter 
what the status of the country, allocating more funds to a program means taking funds 
from another program. In developing countries, even that limited flexibility may not 
exist. In many cases, the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) offices handled the contract based 
on the guarantee of a developed country’s government. This supports the argument that in 
general only developed and developing countries participate in co-development 
programs. It may be hard to justify guaranteeing an underdeveloped country’s 
participation through FMS because they may never be able to repay the funds credited to 
them. Instability may downgrade the economic conditions so much that that participant 
may be obliged to leave the program and thus endanger the entire group.  
Also, there usually is one country in the partnership that pursues the program 
more aggressively than the others that can be called the “champion country”. For 
example, in FLA and the Eurofighter; Germany, in MEADS; the U.S., in JSF; the U.S. 
and Britain were the driving forces behind the progress of the program. The number of 
systems these countries intend to acquire justifies their behavior. Thus, these countries 
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are motivated to make the program economically attractive to possible participants by 
offering flexible burden sharing arrangements, compensating more of the cost than the 
other participants, putting more funds in the program upfront, and offering economic 
benefits, or by other means. In other cases, the program may present such an opportunity 
that it may attract the desired level of interest. One reason for other participants’ 
attraction to the program may be the guarantee that the source country will complete the 
project even without international participation. The JSF is an example of this argument. 
The goal is to produce an affordable next-generation fighter-bomber. It is estimated that 
the JSF will dominate the market in its class for the next 25 to 35 years. It is seen as the 
successor to the long lived F-16. The U.S. and Britain have been working on the concept 
since 1994. Although the U.S.’s funding seemed to be in jeopardy after the U.S. Air 
Force declared the F-22 the desired aircraft, the situation was resolved after the JSF 
program was designated an ACAD-I program in 1996. It can be argued whether or not 
the program is made more complicated by inviting an international presence. At first, the 
program seems strong enough to withstand threatening behaviors such as one or more 
participants leaving the program as occurred in the case of the FLA and Italy leaving the 
program. Second, since this is an R&D and a production effort, contributions to 
efficiency at every phase of the program will be welcomed. Economies of scale should 
also be considered. Every participant in the program is a customer with a demand for 
more production, and thus cost per aircraft decreases. Early participation also makes 
future funding more predictable and stabilizes the program as well as making possible to 
take advantage of opportunities as they appear. Also, the program offers an economic 
return to the participants. While Eurofighter is using production share and a possible 
technology transfer as a marketing tool, JSF is offering returns (depending on the 
participation level in the R&D phase) from sales to non-participant countries. 
Looking at this from another angle, champion countries are expected to behave as 
described above. Germany’s accusation of poor funding from the U.S. for the MEADS 
project may be a result of these expectations. Of course, there were other issues such as 
timely technology/knowledge transfer, a purely U.S. system (PATRIOT PAC-III) 
declared to be the core component of the system. Practices such as offsets and co-
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production arrangements are expected to be a part of weapon systems contracts, because 
as Barry Marvel stated in his article published in Contract Management/May 2001, titled 
“International Offset Practices”: 
Offset contracting is a dynamic, constantly evolving process that reflects 
changes within a country’s economy and society. 
An incentive program became the usual practice in marketing weapon systems, 
which leads to a discussion of the second issue: Why countries are willing to join such 
programs from an economic point of view. One reason is expectation of economic returns 
to the society. Governments want at least a portion of defense spending to go to domestic 
businesses. Laws and regulations such as ‘Buy National” acts support this desire. In some 
situations, sub contracting for specific items within the buyer country may be a 
prerequisite. Such practices serve many purposes. In major defense programs, a 
developed country’s currency, such as the U.S. dollar or Euro, stays within the buyer 
country, which is important for developing countries. Jobs are created for the society that 
may not be efficient in economic terms when considering the “broken window fallacy”, 
but positively affects the leader. When subcontracting is mandated, technology, 
education/training and manufacturing methods are usually transferred. When considering 
the points made in the previous sections, participants may have the opportunity to gain 
experience in new areas. Besides, participation in development also means participating 
in production; when big weapon systems are considered, production may be sustained up 
to 30 years. The program will also be supporting the related portion of the Defense 
Industrial Base. 
Until now, co-development seemed to benefit countries other than the champions. 
But, champion countries have many reasons to pursue a program aggressively. First of 
all, burden of the expensive R&D will be shared. In some situations, international 
involvement may preserve the program. It is always harder to leave an international 
program than it is to abandon a national program. Funding may be more stable since 
participants may choose not to withdraw thinking about their prestige. The countries will 
be exposed to new technologies, training/education and manufacturing methods. 
Participants therefore do not have to excel in every significant area. International 
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arrangements provide enormous opportunities from exposure to the latest technologies, to 
cheap labor and to innovative manufacturing methods.  
It was mentioned previously that national programs usually do not obtain the 
targeted production levels. This threatens the program. Before potential customers 
seriously demand the system, it should be tested and proven in a conflict. Co-
development programs do not need such testing methods. The commitment of the 
countries to the program is a sign that they will be purchasing that system. Usually the 
participants’ demands also include sharing burden for the number of systems to be 
acquired. 
Another issue may be determination of the base currency. A base currency for 
program targets should be determined. Participants may be confused by the use of 
multiple currencies. Currency becomes a big issue especially when inflation is a concern. 
Instabilities may affect one participant more than the others. In general, U.S. dollars are 
chosen as the base currency, and payment arrangements are negotiated according to the 
needs of the participants. 
In general, every participant seeks an economic return when considering a 
partnership besides satisfying the needs of the Armed Forces. International partnerships 
offer many opportunities. Although industry clearly understands these opportunities more 
than the governments, the great responsibilities faced by these governments may justify 
their careful behavior. 
D. INDUSTRY RELATED ISSUES 
In an international partnership for developing weapon systems, governments are 
involved not only through their own Departments of Defense but also politically, having 
secondary goals in mind. In general, the desirable environment is for companies to team 
up and compete for the award. In an ideal situation, they will offer efficiency, better 
performance and cost effectiveness in order to be awarded the program. However, buyers 
usually put forth national enterprises as part of the winning team because of these 
secondary goals. At first, politics is fed by industry money. A weapon systems contract 
will result in a lot of revenue for a period of 20 to 30 years. Industry lobbies are usually 
proactive about such opportunities. Therefore, the representatives of the participant 
 39
nations bring to the negotiations a strong desire to guarantee their national industry’s 
involvement. In our example programs, the usual practice is to agree to a work share 
arrangement. FLA, the Eurofighter and MEADS programs all used the same technique to 
satisfy the participants. In JSF, such an agreement has not yet been reached, but 
participant countries are expecting manufacturing shares to be at the sub-contracting 
level. 
Governments and international treaties strictly control the defense businesses. 
Governments may interfere with mergers, sales to other countries and/or protect the 
firms. Traditionally, defense contractors always are supported to a certain extent by 
governments, since they represent the nation’s independence and many nations have had 
the unfortunate experience of suffering under arms embargos. Another reason defense 
firms obtain support is that governments are liable to perform many duties with limited 
resources. Defense is usually a large portion of national budgets. Therefore, governments 
want to obtain the best value for their purchases. The most effective way to obtain the 
best value seems to be through competition. The government has the incentive to support 
contractors to sustain competition. Some of the methods to reach that objective may be 
regulations to prevent monopolies by not allowing mergers, sharing the production of a 
weapon system between two contractors, requiring the winning contractor to sub-contract 
components to the other contractors or encouraging/discouraging teaming between the 
contractors. In some countries, competition is not possible because only one contractor is 
capable of performing the work. It is very difficult to obtain these capabilities and 
sustaining them is even harder. They need more support than their counterparts in 
developed countries. Governments support them through several methods such as 
arranging partnerships with contractors outside the country as a prerequisite in buying a 
weapon system, making advance payments, awarding maintenance contracts and 
rendering financial help to gain more capabilities. These contractors can be regarded as 
national favorites which is either advantageous to the prime contractor or 
disadvantageous depending on the situation. The prime contractor will be forced to do 
business with the national champion and that may not be efficient. The general principle 
regarding Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” is that if it were more efficient, contractors 
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would team up. On the other hand, such arrangements may offer the prime contractor 
savings, innovative manufacturing and management methods, tax exemptions, and new 
future markets. In many cases, governments are motivated to do business with the foreign 
contractors with which they already have relationships. Besides, the family of weapon 
systems approach encourages countries to acquire new weapon systems from the same 
place because of interoperability and compatibility issues. 
The realization of every weapon system program differs in one way or another 
depending on the situation of the participant countries at that particular time and the 
objective of the partnership. As with the FLA, participants were trying to introduce a 
transport aircraft to their services but using European capabilities was a secondary 
objective. The Eurofighter was also a program that had the same sorts of objectives. 
These projects may be considered methods to sustain national industrial capabilities. At 
first glance, this approach may appear harmful to competition, which governments 
expend a lot of effort to establish. However, in many cases, competition is also 
established at the sub-contracting. In the 1990s, large contractors had to extricate 
themselves from several areas of the defense market because of budget decreases. They 
chose to sub-contract these features and became mainly integrators and niche (or key 
component) manufacturers. At the sub-contractor level, entering and exiting the market is 
easier. National goals, meaning political and economic goals, would accommodate sub-
contracting from other countries. Thus, competition is global. In a partnership, 
subcontracting with their industry partners can satisfy the expectation of economic return. 
Therefore, they may not need to result in a transfer of technology. 
In co-development programs, large contractors may become partners and their 
traditional suppliers may also experience the aforementioned features. In some cases, 
technology sharing enables national industry to become more capable, and thus be able to 
access a wider range of markets. Besides, involvement in such a program may benefit the 
contractor and the sub-contractors by making them more reputable in the market.  
In general, although industry gains many benefits from government involvement 
in international co-development programs, because they are operating in a strictly 
regulated environment, they may prefer that government influence be progressive. In 
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many cases, the secondary objectives pursued by governments do not allow industry to 
find the most efficient relationship or implement the most effective method. 
Governments, understanding the benefits of disengagement, at least in terms of savings, 
try to achieve the desired level of decentralization by specifying performance targets 
rather than dictating detailed design specifications. The JSF is expected to be the 
exemplar of this new era. Another concern is that contractors may subsidize some cost of 
the work done for the governments. The defense market is a low profit margin market. In 
international involvement, the profit margin may even be lower in hopes of future sales. 
In this case, contractors may not be able to afford assuming some of the costs for the 
governments. 
E. RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT, BURDEN AND PRODUCTION 
SHARING 
When countries understand the benefits to be received from cooperation, one-
issue surfaces immediately. Who is going to get what and what amount will be received 
from cooperating? This issue is directly related to the secondary goals of the participants. 
When the project is in the early stages, nations compare the capabilities they have 
and then what will be needed to complete the project. It is during this phase that it is 
likely that new entries will be solicited. The champion nation will try to find a participant 
who can meaningfully contribute to the program. The search for new participants usually 
occurs as follows. The nation which creates the idea, usually the champion nation, will 
introduce it to the other nations within organizations such as NATO. This works like a 
feasibility report. Then, the champion nation will request a committee be formed with the 
interested nations. For example, in MEADS, the idea was introduced to the nations within 
NATO. Then, the interested nations formed a committee to further tailor contractual 
agreements as well as fitting the concept to their individual requirements. However, in 
some cases, the champion nation, possessing all the capabilities needed to complete the 
program, may offer co-development arrangements to the allied countries for marketing 
reasons. Once a system becomes operational, it will probably remain in service for 25 to 
30 years. The system, like a mother hen, will provide the producer work through that 
period of time. This subject will also be discussed during the production-sharing portion 
of this section. 
 42
When cooperating, participants are motivated to seek further benefits beyond just 
satisfying a need in their Armed Forces. During the early stages of cooperation, the 
participant will be competing to receive benefits from the R&D investment. This will 
provide them with new capabilities, jobs for their citizens during the life of the program 
and possible future jobs as well as easy access to other weapon systems programs. 
Working on R&D also provides education/training, expertise for specialists, invites 
brainpower to the country and exposes the country to new methods and therefore, 
allowing new applications in other fields. However, because of the nature of R&D it is 
preferable that R&D investments be conducted in the countries already capable of 
performing that kind of work. There are many examples about the failures programs 
faced because all the participants, suitable to do the job or not, were insisting R&D 
investment occur within their countries. This attitude not only led to wasteful duplication 
of efforts but also ruined the schedule targets of the program. The first volume of 
“Handbook of Defense Economics”, edited by Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler, 
specifically focuses on examples within NATO. To prevent such a pitfall, the Eurofighter 
puts forth the principle that the existing participants should approve every new entrant. 
This allows the participants to be able to choose countries they feel are politically 
reliable. Another way to guarantee progress was JFS’s simulation-based analysis before 
the countries became fully committed to the Engineering, Manufacturing and 
Development phase. A scenario-based simulation is conducted for the candidate nations 
to find out how many aircraft the nation needs or if the nation needs JSF at all. 
R&D work is distributed among participants by requiring subcontracting. There 
are some examples in which R&D work is conducted with government assets or broken 
into parts and contracted in house by the government that received that share. However, 
because the prime contractor who created the winning design will usually be given the 
production contract, it will also choose a prime contractor early on and encourage or 
mandate sub contracting is a more efficient way. This method allows performance specs 
to be used instead of design specs.  
After the R&D phase is contracted, participants will be competing for production 
share. Competition for the production share is expected to be fiercer because participants 
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in developing countries who did not possess R&D capabilities will be involved. Also, in 
this phase, new entrants may be expected. It is more likely that developing countries 
would like to see a stable design before they risk a large amount of money and since this 
is the only phase in which an economic return can be expected. This phase is also the 
longest and can be distributed among the participants or among new customers in the 
form of offsets. This is also the phase, which is monitored much closely for savings and 
innovation. With this logic, it appears that only during the production phase may 
significant savings be introduced into the program. 
Production is the phase during which more of the participants are expected to 
compete for a share. Also, the competition is usually over the same or similar products. 
For example, in an aircraft, annual expenses result from the engine and the avionics. 
Many countries developed capabilities that resulted in fiercer competition for these parts 
at the sub contracting level. Also, having the right production share could result in being 
a logistics center for the system. Thus, infrastructure investment in that country will 
provide long term jobs, education/training and exposure to the latest technological 
advances and upgrades related to the system.   
As mentioned previously, participants monitor this phase in terms of cost, 
performance and schedule. Once production begins, it is very difficult and expensive to 
change the process. The expense will be both in monetary value and schedule. In general, 
the group will assign a sub-committee to monitor progress and inform the partners. Also, 
engineering changes represent a challenge. All of the proposed changes must be approved 
by the participants. Custom requirements will not be introduced to production. Besides, if 
a proposed change would affect a participant’s share in the project, obtaining approval 
may be very difficult or cause a participant to leave the partnership. Participants may 
therefore require the project to be conducted under a higher level organization. That fact 
that Germany and Italy requested the MEADS project be conducted under the auspices of 
NATO may be a result of such a concern. 
In every phase of the program, all participants will be concerned with cost. Since 
the example projects are development and production programs, cost estimation may not 
be accurate and is usually lower than actually realized. However, because participant 
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countries usually plan their budgets yearly, it is necessary for them to know the estimated 
burden they share. Every project uses a different burden sharing method. Generally most 
favored method is sharing the burden depending on the percentage of systems 
participants declare they will acquire. In FLA and the Eurofighter, this same method is 
also used in production sharing. JSF is structured a little differently. The project defined 
several phases in which participation levels, certain burden fees and benefits were 
determined.  
Burden sharing may be an issue when one of the countries leaves the program. 
When Italy left the FLA program, all shares had to be recalculated. This endangers 
completion of the program, and therefore participants usually request a signed document 
as a show of intent or as a memorandum of understanding. These documents usually 
determine the exit criteria. Unless a nation provides an element vital to the project, this 
particular country’s R&D or production shares will disappear if that nation leaves the 
program. In co-development programs, benefits are directly related to the burden shared. 
Participants may even cancel the program if a country producing a vital element in the 
project leaves. 
In some cases, the champion nation may volunteer to take on the larger portion of 
the burden for several reasons. Their priority may be the schedule, since the program may 
be needed to strengthen an ally or an organization, contribute to achieving a political or 
economic goal, be the only participant nation with most of the assets needed to complete 
the project. 
The general attitude in R&D, production and burden sharing is to obtain a benefit 
as much as or close to the amount of the burden shared. In a program, every participant 
may have different priorities so these issues may be readily solved. On the other hand, 
because capabilities in developing countries are usually similar, some competition for 
specific sub contracts should be expected. The biggest problem in international programs 
is the long decision cycle because participants are cautious and in some cases number of 
participants may be more than practical. The participant nations must develop adequate 
communication and a common understanding. This can be achieved by playing with an 
open deck. 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the 1990’s, many nations faced the consequences of economic crisis. A crisis in 
Japan affected the economy in Italy. The world market established such a network that, as 
in the chaos theory, a butterfly’s peaceful flight in one part of the world may cause a 
tornado in the other part of the world. In addition, this network is sustained by a computer 
network, the Internet that never sleeps. The easy and cheap transfer of knowledge has 
resulted in many opportunities. Companies realized the presence of a global market, 
which persuaded them to change the methods they used to do business. Many mergers, 
joint ventures, licensing and sub contracting arrangements were made. In some cases, the 
governments supported these arrangements and in other cases, Governments forbade. 
Although Adam Smith’s invisible hand shaped and is still shaping the market, the 
Defense Industry is a special case as Adam Smith also stated. It is not easy to enter the 
defense market, nor it is easy to leave. National authorities are closely monitoring and 
influencing this market. In this sense, it is not a free market, and never has been. The 
balance between supply and demand as well as the circumstances of the supplier and the 
demander determines the dynamics in a free market. However, political aspects of the 
defense market caused it to be heavily regulated. On the other hand, production exists in 
the Defense Industry as in other industries. It was not possible for the industry to 
disregard the new emerging attitude and opportunities. Production methods, cheaper 
labor rates, access to new markets or obtaining a larger share from the present market, 
R&D capabilities and tax issues are some of the opportunities the Defense Industry is 
willing to pursue. 
Also the change in world order may be a result of the new political attitude, or the 
new attitude may have resulted from the change in the world order. Regardless of how it 
occurred, the new environment affected the Defense Industry. Organizations such as 
NATO reviewed their missions, and even the most unthinkable has happened. The lead 
country of the opposing side is joining de facto the other side’s organization. 
Consequently, the governments had the opportunity to move the massive amount of 
resources being spent on defense to other areas. The next question was how much to cut. 
 46
Many countries later realized that their budget cuts were more than they should have 
been. Forces needed to be adequately funded in order to be sustained. Also, as regards 
defense, new, technologically up-and-coming weapons should be introduced into the 
inventories. Budget cuts mandated that DoD managers use more of the budget for 
operations and maintenance. This situation jeopardizes the basic concept of the new 
military; modern, technologically advanced but smaller mobile forces inflicting the least 
possible collateral damage. This train of thought inspired some ideas such as one aircraft 
for the Air Force. The idea was that the aircraft would be so technologically advanced 
that it would be able to fulfill all the missions requested by it. And, as an aside, there 
would only be one because a country could only afford one system. Of course this is not 
possible, one item can only be in one place at the same time. Many more than one system 
are needed for an effective presence throughout the globe. Those systems must have a 
high enough level of technology to be effective, but most importantly, the opposing force 
must be deterred from using its weapons. In this sense, the R&D effort is one of the 
essential strategic assets of the military environment. 
For DoD the challenge has been to maintain the needed force level while 
modernizing it. For industry, survival in a shrinking market depends on being involved in 
new projects that are highly specialized compared to commercial projects. However, the 
increasing time between major systems acquisitions is a threat to industry, since the 
capital acquired from these projects forms the seed money for R&D. Also, R&D is the 
asset that enables the companies to compete on and obtain new weapons contracts. As we 
all know, R&D is not cheap. 
One traditional approach to development projects was for the government to 
declare a need and the projected solution to fulfill it. Then, the companies would compete 
on price since the government provided design would not allow innovation to be 
introduced into the process other than production methods that could only result in 
savings. On the other hand, insisting on a strict design many times harmed the programs 
in terms of cost, performance and schedule. After the 1990s, the Armed Forces, or by 
generalizing, the government agencies, were no longer the leaders in introducing 
technology. When the hardships of doing business with the government are considered, it 
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has been demonstrated that even many traditional contractors were no longer willing to 
do business with the government. The government then undertook to understand and 
adapt to the new environment. For this reason, students from about seventy different 
countries attend the Naval Postgraduate School. Acquisition reforms, and incentive 
programs were the first solutions the governments implemented to overcome the 
problem. These solutions addressed continuance of the traditional, independent national 
defense capability. But, those countries also belonged to organizations, some of which 
were related to defense. Strategic alliances enabled the nations to think as a group. 
Other proposed solutions were not far behind. In the “Handbook of Defense 
Economics”, one of the two editors, Keith Hartley, University of York, proposes an 
“international specialization based on comparative advantage”. That meant participants in 
a NATO like organization can share the missions and build their Forces to achieve that 
mission. This idealistic approach does not consider the historical conflicts between the 
nations belonging to the same organization. In short, every country wants to have an Air 
Force, so the best solution seems to be cooperating to develop the needed equipment. 
Then the challenge is to come together and address the common needs as soon as 
possible. Thus, addressing needs collectively may demonstrate that these needs can be 
fulfilled in a collaborative way by sharing resources and capabilities, just as in the 
example projects in this thesis. There are some concerns in following this course, but new 
solutions are constantly seen that work for all the participants in a program in the latest 
projects. For example, Dr. Paul G. Kaminski made a statement about the JSF program in 
the interview published under the name “Reengineering The Acquisition Process” 
(www.afji.com/mags/1997/june/feat_kaminski.html):  
The JSF management team did a very good job of creating some different 
models for cooperation, all of which involve ‘entry ramps’ and ‘exit 
ramps’ for participating foreign nations. A country can come in as a full 
partner or simply as an informed buyer. It costs $10 million to have a seat 
at the table. That allows a participating nation to get a good view of how 
the program’s requirements are being developed and then to decide if it 
wants to participate at a greater level or not. 
I have found literature addressing the conditions for a successful international 
cooperation. In the article Gary D. Stephens published under the name “International 
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Cooperative Programs” (Dudley Knox Library, Database search), he contemplates three 
considerations that structure the partnership for success. The considerations he addressed 
are present in the example projects in this thesis and I assume will be concerns in future 
international co-developments. The first is the existence of a common need. Without 
communication, nations will not be aware of how common that particular need is. 
Organizations like NATO are constantly working on that issue. The second consideration 
is that the program supports the partners’ national policies. Nations participate in 
arrangements or organizations that are politically close to them. For example probability 
of the U.S. participating in a cooperative program with Iran is very low. Therefore, this is 
not a big challenge. The third consideration is measuring the program in terms of 
collaboration versus cooperation. According to G. D. Stephens, collaboration means the 
partners contribute to the solution rather than simply providing financial resources. If 
there are too many participants in a collaborative program, the schedule and performance 
of the program may be harmed because it is harder to agree on a solution when too many 
are involved in the debate. On the other hand, cooperation may not fulfill the secondary 
goals of the participants. Mr. Stephens states that he views international cooperative 
programs as similar to offsets, foreign military sales and international teaming with the 
exception that international cooperative programs lower the risk of the program being 
terminated. 
The examples in this thesis were chosen from ongoing major weapon systems 
projects. Every individual project is a further research opportunity. Besides, economic 
and politic snapshots of the participants can be taken and their effect on the countries’ 
decision as well as how these decisions affected the program may be researched. Things 
we learned by looking at these programs in this thesis are; number of participants is very 
important because, the bigger the consortium, the harder to give quick decisions about the 
trade offs in the program. Participants’ economic condition has a large affect on the 
program. This statement leads to the argument that I made in this thesis, only developed 
and developing countries will be involved in an international co-development. Programs 
may address a secondary goal, other than satisfying a military need like sustaining 
Europe’s capabilities in FLA and Eurofighter programs. And also every participant has 
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secondary goals, usually related to economic return. Participants’ priorities may differ, 
for example schedule may not have the same level of priority in all the participants’ 
agenda. National security may be an issue when technology transfer is considered. 
Industrial infrastructure determines the suitability of countries for certain parts of the 
program like some countries may not be suitable to conduct R&D or a part of the 
production. Technology transfer has a cost. Some participants may be willing to commit 
more resources to a program than the others. Participants will be pursuing potential 
economic returns in the program. Burden sharing cannot be considered apart from 
economic return issues. R&D, production and burden sharing are negotiable issues. Co-
development arrangements are one way to get around budget constraints in introducing 
latest technology to the war fighter. Collective behavior will be awarded by efficiency. 
Industry is many times willing to work with international partners. Marketing is easier 
when there is international involvement in the program. Alliances provide a suitable 
environment for international co-developments. Past experience shows that elasticity in 
goals, finding common needs and compliance with national policy are the keys to success 
in an international cooperation. However, one thing should be kept in mind. Every nation 
keeps the secondary goals in mind when participating in an international program.  
In general, international involvement can introduce economies of scale, new 
contractors/subcontractors and production methods, stability to the program, customers 
for the weapon system, interoperability and relations between nations that may result in a 
strategic alliance and cultural exchange.  
A major weapon system has the power to change the culture of a force as the F-16 
did to many countries after it was added to their inventory. Major weapon systems 
continue to introduce logistics concepts as well as technology and new methods. As this 
thesis demonstrates the ever changing world order requires the largest organizations, the 
Armed Forces, to adapt and adapt quickly. The cost of being late can be enormous. This 
not only results in a loss of money but also loss of capabilities. Falling budget requires 
military to find efficient methods to fulfill operational needs.  
International co-development efforts are a useful method to meet these needs. 
They introduce more opportunities than just satisfying the military needs. More co-
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developed projects on a larger scale can be expected in every sector, but mainly in the 
Defense Industry. So Governments should see the benefits of international co-
developments and review their policies to adapt. Government contractors, understanding 
these efficiencies, are already changing their strategies accordingly. Governments must 
do the same. After all, those who cannot adapt and evolve will perish. 
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